Andrew Sullivan, Intersectionality, and Donald Trump

While considering the violent mob of students that attacked author Charles Murray and Prof. Allison Stanger at Middlebury College, Andrew Sullivan asks “Is Intersectionality a Religion?”  His answer is “almost,” noting that the New New Left essentially demands conversion, puritanically controls controls language and the terms of discourse, and seeks to ban heresy.  For this, he got a lot of positive comment across the political spectrum, and I’m not sure why.

I mean, he’s correct, but the theory isn’t new to Sullivan.  As Frank Bruni notes, both John McWhorter and Jonathan Haidt have made much the same argument.

Nor is this sort of thinking new for Sullivan.  He previously referred to dismissed Mozilla exec Brendan Eich as a heretic while condemning his persecutors.  And he has in theory been good on religious liberty legislation.  I suppose Sullivan holding the same position for this long a time is notable, but c’mon.

What interests me about the piece is how it fits into his latest return to writing, which was occasioned by the ascent of then-candidate Donald Trump.

Sullivan’s initial longform piece for New York magazine begins by analyzing a passage in Plato’s Republic.  Sullivan writes that “the longer a democracy lasted, Plato argued, the more democratic it would become.  Its freedoms would multiply; its equality spread.  Deference to any sort of authority would wither; tolerance of any kind of inequality would come under intense threat; and multiculturalism and sexual freedom would create a city or a country like ‘a many-colored cloak decorated in all hues’.”

He continues: “As the authority of elites fades, as Establishment values cede to popular ones… when elites are despised and full license is established to do ‘whatever one wants,’ you arrive at what might be called late-stage democracy.”  And it is at this point, Plato and Sullivan claim, that a tyrant can seize the moment.  You know who Sullivan casts in that role.

The problem with Sullivan’s thesis is that the erosion of authority and promotion of license in America is not entirely due to too much democracy, is it?

The erosion of authority can occur, for example, when elite colleges decide to stop requiring students to learn about the virtues of Western civilization.  It can occur when Pres. Obama decides to simply stop enforcing the law for broad classes of people on subjects including immigration and healthcare.  And it can occur when people come to believe we are ruled by judicial fiat, symbolized in the cases of Roe v. Wade (which made abortion a constitutional right) and Obergefell v. Hodges (which did the same for same-sex marriage).

Sullivan is of course best-known as one of America’s foremost advocates for same-sex marriage.  As such, he reveled in the Obergefell decision, much as he had earlier when other courts reached the same result.

The dissenting opinions in Obergefell highlight how undemocratic the decision is — and how short it is on legal authority.  The subsequent death of one of those dissenters — Justice Antonin Scalia — made the composition and activism of the Supreme Court a chief selling point for traditional Republicans and conservatives (especially evangelicals and Catholics) to hold their noses and vote for Trump, a man whose picture appears nowhere near the dictionary definition of “pious.”

In the run-up to this decision, people like Rod Dreher warned of the McCarthyism that would follow in the wake of a decision like Obergefell.  Sullivan dismissed these warnings as whining — “the hysteria and self-pity among those who, for centuries, enjoyed widespread endorsement for the horrible mistreatment of gay people.”

And yet for all his years of demonizing social conservatives as “Christianists,” who’s the one looking naive when leftist social media mobs and fanatical bureaucrats put Christians out of business for not wanting to participate in same-sex marriages?  Or when President Obama tried to force the Little Sisters of the Poor to pay for birth control?  Or when academics are battered in parking lots?

It turns out the real religious threat comes from the New New Left — as Sullivan seems to be the last to discover.

While Sullivan will note that he has deplored the oppression and violence of the New New Left, also note that he finds the GOP and conservatives “loony” for holding the same position on same-sex marriage Barack Obama held less than a decade prior.  He apparently doesn’t realize how short a drive it is from that dismissal to the home of “check your privilege.”  Or from blaming the current generation of social conservatives for centuries of mistreatment to the idea of original sin.  Having missed the last slippery slope, I expect him to miss this one also.

By his own Platonic argument, Sullivan was a significant actor in creating the kind of country in which Donald Trump can become President.  Indeed, by Sullivan’s standards for causation — under which Sarah Palin could be blamed for the shooting of Rep. Gabrielle Giffords — he deserves a portrait in the Hall of How We Got Trump.  No wonder he started writing again: it’s penance.

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The Conservative Movement: What Happened?

The “Milo Yiannapolous disinvited from CPAC” story may be dead, But Commentary’s Noah C. Rothman and the Daily Beast’s Mark K. Lewis got good columns out of it by using the incident as a signpost on the road to decline the conservative movement seems to have traveled over the years.

It is in part a tale recalling Eric Hoffer’s observation: “Every great cause begins as a movement, becomes a business, and eventually degenerates into a racket.”

This is the part of the tale they tell.  Rothman blames the state of the movement on “[t]he right’s entertainment class,”  while Lewis argues that “Yiannopoulos’s invitation was, perhaps, the logical denouement for a cause that prioritizes provocateurs over polemicists and entertainment over substance.”

This is all true as far as it goes.  It is certainly true of CPAC.  But it is not the whole story and misses important pieces that will be necessary to any sort of conservative regrouping.

One of the main things Rothman gets right is that for many who consider themselves conservative, “their introduction to conservatism came not from reading the philosophy of John Locke and Edmund Burke but from a casual exposure to Rush Limbaugh and Sean Hannity.”  But the primary problem with this is not necessarily that the latter have been provocateurs (Limbaugh’s peak audience and influence occurred while he was at his least provocative).

Rather, the issue is that the understanding people get of conservatism from talk radio (or cable news as talk radio with pictures) is and almost inherently will be shallow.  There is an old adage (of uncertain origin) that “great minds discuss ideas; average minds discuss events; [and] small minds discuss people.”  Programming aimed at entertaining a mass audience will tend to reflect this dynamic, regardless of how provocative it is or how valid any particular provocation may be.

A conservative movement that is broad but shallow will be more likely to claim it embraces constitutional conservatism but ignore constitutional and prudential political constraints when they become frustrated, for example, that a GOP Congress seemed so ineffective in advancing a conservative agenda.  This is part of the reason many conservatives wrongly discount some of the achievements of the GOP to which Rothman correctly refers.

Conversely, however, the shallowness of many ostensible conservatives also partially explains why the GOP could be as politically successful as it is today.  The ascension of Pres. Trump is, if nothing else, a wake-up call to how little influence the conservative movement has had within the GOP, contra Rothman’s claim that the current “Congress is also one of the most conservative in the country’s history.”

This is a claim which is, imho, deeply ahistorical.  The postwar period has been one where the overarching trend has been to cultural and political progressivism.  What seems like stolid conservatism these days mostly represents fairly modest attempts to regain ground lost over the course of decades of cultural and political losses.

Moreover, conservatives across the spectrum disagree over what to make of this central dynamic.  Peggy Noonan, not exactly a fire-breather, was nonetheless able to recognize the frustration conservatives have over the fact that the GOP, even when controlling the government as they did for six years under George W. Bush, still seemed to negotiate and grow the government as if they were the minority party.  David Brooks looked at the same frustrated conservatives as engaged in identity politics.

Perhaps both Noonan and Brooks had a point, and the inability of the GOP establishment to successfully manage True Conservatives (both actual conservatives and shallower people who imagine themselves to be) and more intelligently address their concerns eventually boiled over into frustrated people comparing the 2016 election to Flight 93.

The other problem with a conservative movement that can be both shallow and aggressive is alluded to, but not fully explored, by Lewis.

As Lewis notes, “[t]rue conservatism has been replaced by a fetish for fighting political correctness.”  It is perhaps a coincidence that Limbaugh went national at approximately the same time that Jesse Jackson was leading college kids in chants of, “Hey hey, ho ho, Western Civ. has got to go,” but maybe it wasn’t a total coincidence.

The confluence here is remarkable.  Political correctness is in large part about making America’s intellectual discourse more shallow and less conservative.  The revolt against political correctness — at least the mass (dare I say populist) revolt against it — often has the same characteristics.

The demands of mass media that inexorably drive the discussion more to people and events than ideas will also tend to shape the debate into one about who people are against, rather than the underlying ideological conflict.  This is particularly true of conservatism, which is a default for people seeking to protect what’s good about the status quo; the focus moves toward the attackers and the attack, not on the advancement of the virtues of what we seek to conserve.

Lastly, Rothman and Lewis largely avoid addressing that the most recent iteration of this battle is marked by an even more totalitarian Left than the spasm that played out in the late 80s and early 90s.  The New New Left, in an almost Newtonian fashion, will push more people into the camp that opposes the politicization of all aspects of American life.

What it does not ensure is that the marginal increases in the opposition to totalitarianism will be conservative, or even much care about conservatism on any philosophical questions.  Rather, they are the “Not Left,” people simply looking for a champion to repel the barbarians at the gates.  And when the GOP establishment fails at constructively addressing deep or shallow conservatives, it should be no surprise that some — certainly the latter –will look to the provocateurs raising the banner highest against the immediate threat.

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